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Abstract
Due to their great flexibility, nonparametric Bayes methods have proven to be a valuable tool
for discovering complicated patterns in data. The term “nonparametric Bayes” suggests that
these methods inherit model-free operating characteristics of classical nonparametric methods,
as well as coherent uncertainty assessments provided by Bayesian procedures. However, as the
authors say in the conclusion to their article, nonparametric Bayesian methods may be more
aptly described as “massively parametric.” Furthermore, I argue that many of the default non-
parametric Bayes procedures are only Bayesian in the weakest sense of the term, and cannot be
assumed to provide honest assessments of uncertainty merely because they carry the Bayesian
label. However useful such procedures may be, we should be cautious about advertising default
nonparametric Bayes procedures as either being “assumption free” or providing descriptions of
our uncertainty. If we want our nonparametric Bayes procedures to have a Bayesian interpre-
tation, we should modify default NP Bayes methods to accommodate real prior information,
or at the very least, carefully evaluate the effects of hyperparameters on posterior quantities of
interest.
Keywords: marginal likelihood, model misspecification, prior specification, sandwich estimation.
1 Parameteric and nonparametric approaches
Historically, a standard justification of Bayesian methods has been that they provide an internally
consistent approach to updating information: If PΘ = {p(y|θ) : θ ∈ Θ} expresses our beliefs about
Y given θ, and pi(θ) expresses our beliefs about θ, then pi(θ|y) ∝ pi(θ)p(y|θ) expresses what we
should believe about θ, having observed Y = y. From this subjective Bayesian point of view,
for pi(θ|y) to be of most use, both p(y|θ) and pi(θ) should actually represent our beliefs, at least
approximately. A criticism of parameteric Bayesian methods is that commonly used models PΘ
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are often suspected of being wrong. Nonparametric Bayes methods appear to solve this problem
by making PΘ so large that it includes essentially all relevant sampling distributions p(y|θ). The
authors seem to suggest that NP Bayes methods therefore provide an “honest representation of
uncertainties”. I would agree with this, to the extent that pi(θ) actually represents prior beliefs.
How honest are parametric and nonparametric priors? Parametric priors are arguably inaccu-
rate as they assign probability one to a simple parametric model. However, the great advantage of
parametric Bayesian approaches is that they allow the prior to be specified in terms of parameters
of interest, which often happen to be the parameters about which we have real prior information.
As a very simple example, suppose we have a sample y1, . . . , yn of independent observations from
a population for which we have prior information about the mean and variance. In this case, a
limited form of subjective, robust Bayesian inference for the population mean θ can proceed via
the posterior density obtained from a normal sampling model for y1, . . . , yn. While the likelihood
may not be exactly correct, the resulting inferences for θ are robust to nonnormality, asymptoti-
cally correct and provide confidence intervals for which the asymptotic frequentist coverage equals
the asymptotic Bayesian coverage. Perhaps most importantly, the inference is transparent: the
approximate normality of y¯ is well understood, and the effect of the prior on the parameter is
simple, especially if a conjugate prior is used. Even if the prior does not represent our actual prior
information, at least we can understand what information it represents.
In contrast, I think it is safe to say that for most NP Bayes methods used in practice, the
prior does not represent actual prior beliefs, even approximately. One difficulty is that standard
NP Bayes priors include hyperparameters that directly control things that we are unlikely to have
prior information about (the number of modes of a density) and only indirectly control things we
might have information about (means, variances and correlations). For example, the choice of the
hyperparameters in the prior for a Dirichlet process mixture model (DPMM) induces a prior on the
mean and variance of the population, but the mapping from the hyperparameters to these induced
priors can be very opaque (Yamato, 1984; Lijoi and Regazzini, 2004). Similarly, the Po´lya tree
priors discussed in Section 2.2 require the specification of a partition over the sample space, the
choice of which will generally affect the posterior. The “solution” to this is the addition of a prior
over the set of possible partitions. It is hard to imagine that such a prior represents actual prior
information about the underlying population.
Do such complications warrant abandoning NP Bayes methods and using simpler parameteric
approaches? It may depend on the data analysis objectives. NP Bayes methods provide a flexible
means of representing high-dimensional data structure. Overfitting is avoided by a regularizer (the
prior) that has a probabilistic interpretation. These features make NP Bayes methods an attractive
set of tools for such tasks as prediction and clustering. However, if the data analysis objective is to
describe our posterior information about a parameter of interest, then the appropriateness of NP
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Bayes is less clear. Example 1 from Mu¨ller and Mitra (2013) is a situation where the use of an NP
Bayes method may be obfuscating the sources of information about the parameter interest, F (0).
If we are to take the likelihood at face value, then it seems the data have little to say about the
value of F (0): Writing fk = F (k) and letting nk be the number of T -cell sequences for which k
replicates were observed, the likelihood can be expressed as p(y|f0, . . . , f4) =
∏
4
k=1
(fk/[1− f0])nk .
How much information do the data provide about f0? One way to evaluate this is to consider
the profile likelihood function of f0. For every fixed value of f0 the likelihood p(y|f0, . . . , f4) =∏
4
k=1
(fk/[1 − f0])nk is maximized in f1, . . . , f4 at fˆk = (1− f0)nk/n. This gives a constant profile
likelihood function for f0, equal to
∏
(nk/n)
nk for every value of f0. From a Bayesian perspective,
the posterior distribution of f0 can be expressed as pi(f0|y) ∝ pi(f0)p(y|f0), where
p(y|f0) =
∫
p(y|f0, . . . , f4)pi(f1, . . . , f4|f0) df1 · · · df4.
The profile likelihood argument suggests that p(y|f0) will be fairly flat as a function of f0, especially
if the prior over f1, . . . , f4 is “diffuse,” in which case pi(f0|y) ≈ pi(f0). In this case, an “honest
assessment” of posterior uncertainty about f0 requires only an honest prior for f0. Alternatively, if
we believe there to be a relationship among f0, . . . , f4 beyond the fact that f0 + · · ·+ f4 < 1, then
again an honest assessment of posterior uncertainty about f0 for these data requires only an honest
specification of ones joint beliefs about the five numbers f0, . . . , f4. In either case, the DPMM
over {f0, f1, . . .} seems like a very indirect and opaque way to specify a prior over the relevant
parameters.
One could argue that the DPMM in this example is helping us estimate other aspects of the
unknown frequencies, such as the relative frequencies, perhaps. However, even though the DPMM
in this example is billed as a “nonparametric Bayes” procedure, it is not without strong model-
ing assumptions. Specifically, this DPMM assumes the true distribution is a mixture of Poisson
distributions - a class of distributions that does not contain all discrete distributions.
2 Partial remedies for particular situations
Alternative likelihoods: Consider a model {p(y|f) : f ∈ F} where f is a high dimensional
parameter (such as a regression function or density). In situations where primary interest is in a
low-dimensional parameter θ = θ(f), the difficulties of infinite-dimensional prior specification can
sometimes be avoided by using a likelihood that involves only θ. For example, in many problems
there exists a statistic t(y) whose distribution depends only on θ, and not the high-dimensional
parameter f . In such cases, the likelihood can be expressed as
p(y|f) = p(t(y)|θ)× p(y|t(y), θ, f).
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The need to specify a prior over f can be avoided by constructing a posterior distribution for θ
based only on the marginal likelihood p(t(y)|θ), i.e. pi(θ|t(y)) ∝ pi(θ)p(t(y)|θ). Estimates based on
such a posterior distribution could be inefficient, as they ignore any additional information about θ
in p(y|t(y), θ, f), but they do not require specification of a prior for the high-dimensional nuisance
parameter f . A concrete example of such a procedure is given in Hoff (2007) in the context of a
semiparametric copula model, in which θ represents the parameters in a parametric dependence
model and f parameterizes a set of unknown infinite-dimensional univariate marginal distributions.
Many researchers have considered other alternative likelihoods for robust or “nonparametric”
Bayesian inference (Efron (1993); Lazar (2003); Greco et al. (2008), to name a few). Asymptotically
correct likelihoods for parameters of interest can even be derived from misspecified models: Very
generally, the limiting distribution of the MLE θˆ in a misspecified model is asymptotically normal,
so that √
n(θ∗ − θˆ) ·∼ N(0, V (θ∗))
where θ∗ is the “pseudotrue” parameter and V (θ∗) is the “sandwich” variance (Huber, 1967). In
many cases (such as in exponential family models) θ∗ is a population moment, and possibly the
parameter of interest about which we may have prior information. In this case, nonparametric
Bayesian inference can be obtained by combining a prior on θ∗ with the asymptotic normal distri-
bution of θˆ as a likelihood. Such “Bayesian sandwich” procedures have been considered Szpiro et al.
(2010), Mu¨ller (2012) and Hoff and Wakefield (2012).
Marginally specified priors: Such reductions of the parameter space are not feasible in applica-
tions such as prediction, where the high- or infinite-dimensional parameter f is of primary interest.
In such cases it is important from a Bayesian perspective that the prior for f reflects known in-
formation as much as possible. Realistically, a statistician is unlikely to have informed opinions
about all aspects of a high-dimensional parameter f , but may have real information about a finite-
dimensional functional θ = θ(f), such as the population mean or variance. Recently, Kessler et al.
(2012) have proposed an approach for incorporating prior information about θ into a default NP
Bayes prior for f . Specifically, let pi0 be a prior for f that is chosen arbitrarily or for computational
convenience. This prior induces a marginal prior on θ, say P0, that may not reflect actual prior
information, as quantified by a distribution P1. To remedy this problem, first express the default
prior pi0 as
pi0(f ∈ A) =
∫
pi0(f ∈ A|θ)P0(dθ).
To obtain a prior pi1 over f with the desired marginal distribution P1, simply replace P0 with P1
in the above expression. The resulting prior on f then becomes
pi1(f ∈ A) =
∫
pi0(f ∈ A|θ)P1(dθ).
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Such a prior generally retains the good large-support properties of the default NP Bayes prior pi0,
but has an induced prior over θ that matches the actual prior information P1. Computation of
the posterior under such a prior is also generally available if an MCMC algorithm exists for the
default prior pi0. In this case, posterior approximation under pi1 can be made with the addition of
a Metropolis-Hastings step.
Noninformative priors: In the absence of prior information, NP Bayes practitioners may at-
tempt to produce “diffuse” priors by adjusting the hyperparameters in some way. However, intuition
about what parameters correspond to “noninformativeness” can be misleading, partly due to the
terminology used in the NP Bayes literature. For example, NP Bayes researchers should make
clear that the total mass parameter α in a DPMM controls much more than “the uncertainty of”
the mixing measure. As DPMM researchers know, this hyperparameter controls such things as the
entropy of the resulting probability density, the number of modes, etc. As another example, practi-
tioners sometimes select overdispersed base measures in DPMMs in the hope that these reduce the
effect of the prior on the analysis. Bush et al. (2010) have shown that such attempts generally lead
to an unreasonably small number of mixture components, and propose a more nuanced version of
the total mass hyperparameter to achieve a type of “noninformative” NP Bayes analysis.
3 Conclusion
Standard data analysis procedures can generally be described as techniques that convert a large set
of numbers (the data) into a smaller set of numbers (parameter estimates, standard errors, etc.).
Ideally, such a procedure is statistically meaningful and reasonably transparent: meaningful in that
it has some desirable property in an idealized situation, and transparent so that its behavior can
be understood outside of the idealized situation. Conjugate Bayesian estimation in an exponential
family model is a good example of a meaningful and transparent procedure: The properties of such
procedures are well-understood in the subjective Bayes framework, in an asymptotic framework
and even in settings where the model is misspecified. In many cases, incorrect parameteric models
can provide meaningful, transparent and accurate inference for certain population parameters of
interest, if not for all aspects of the population.
NP Bayes procedures typically convert a small set of numbers (the data) into a much larger set
of numbers (the posterior distribution of the infinite dimensional parameter). What meaning can
such extrapolative procedures have? Asymptotic results assure us that many NP Bayes procedures
converge to the truth as fast as other nonparametric procedures, and perhaps faster if the the prior
is close to the truth in a topological sense (see, for example, Ghosal (2001)). It might even be the
case that 95% posterior confidence intervals have approximate 95% frequentist coverage, as they
often do in parametric models (Severini, 1991).
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How are NP Bayes procedures justified non-asymptotically? Small sample justifications of
Bayesian procedures are often based on their optimality under a particular prior. In simple models,
this justification is transparent, in that even if the prior doesn’t represent one’s actual beliefs, at
least one understands what beliefs it represents. Prior specification for NP Bayes procedures are
more opaque and harder to justify from a Bayesian perspective. Default prior distributions are not
generally going to represent prior beliefs, making it difficult to interpret the corresponding posterior
distributions as posterior beliefs (except perhaps asymptotically). In terms of transparency, it is
certainly possible to gain a strong intuition for the effects of hyperparameters on posterior output.
Yet expert nonparametric Bayesians frequently use terminology that may be misleading to less
experienced NP Bayes practitioners: For example, referring to the mass parameter α in a DPMM
as indexing uncertainty is an incomplete description at best. Referring to a DPMM as a method
for “BNP inference” on a clustering overlooks, as the authors pointed out in Section 3.1, that the
Po´lya urn scheme is a very particular one-parameter partition model. Referring to a mixture of
Poisson distributions as “nonparametric” may give the impression to the inexperienced reader that
the resulting mixture model contains all discrete distributions.
Most importantly, a posterior distribution does not provide an honest assessment of uncertainty
by virtue of being a posterior distribution. Such an assessment is obtained via either an honest
prior or asymptotically. In the absence of an infinite sample size, considerable effort should be
made to use a prior distribution that approximates as closely as possible any real prior information
that is available. In the absence of prior information, a more complete (but tedious) description of
uncertainty would include a sensitivity analysis over possible values of the hyperparameters.
I am certainly not arguing that such efforts regarding the prior be mandated for every application
of an NP Bayes method. However, I feel that more effort in this direction is necessary if we want
our posterior distributions to represent honest assessments of uncertainty.
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